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In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in 
parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a 
trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. 
If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely 
to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. 
These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament 
from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along 
with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of 
citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These 
citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. 
Conversely, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in many respects, like voting 
attendance and bills sponsorship. 
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1 Introduction
In almost every parliamentary democracy elected officials are paid a fixed salary, whether
they work hard or not. What is not always recognized is that in many countries, like Italy,
France, Germany, and the UK, members of parliament can keep working in the private
sector after election. Outside employment can be either the continuation of a previous
activity or something completely new. It is easy to think of an entrepreneur who keeps
running a company while holding a seat in parliament, or a lawyer who still attends to his
clients. It is harder to think of a civil servant or any other employee doing this, because
they would need to regularly show up to work or because some incompatibilities might
apply. Nevertheless, even in countries with a strict system of regulations, like the US,
politicians can earn money outside of parliament by offering consulting, writing books or
giving speeches and lectures, no matter what their previous job may have been.1
Politicians’ outside employment has been long debated in many countries. In the US,
for instance, the law regulating outside employment was tightened in 1977 after a tough
confrontation inside Congress. As summarized at that time by Senator Bob Packwood
(R) in his speech to the Senate, there were mainly two rationales for a strict limitation of
outside income:2
“One, it is we ought to be full time Senators and we should not do anything that
takes time away from this job. That is the time argument. Two, it is a conflict. If
we go out and speak, it is indeed a conflict and that ought to be barred.”
Other politicians opposed the tightening by arguing that citizens with remarkable
market activity would choose not to run for elective office rather than give up their private
business. Referring to his choice to run for Congress while maintaining an external source
of income as a lawyer, Senator Edmund Muskie (D) declared:3
“I feel very strongly about this, and I say once more that maybe I did make a mistake
22 years ago. But I do know this, that the only thing that has made it possible for
me to stay in public life 22 years was my choice - and I think it was an honorable
choice - of this source of income for all of that time.”
1In the US outside income cannot exceed 15% of the salary of an Executive Public Officer, which in
2006 was $165,200. See the Appendix A for a review of outside income regulations across countries.
2Congressional Record, Senate, March 21 1977, pg. 8333, Official Conduct Amendments of 1977.
3Congressional Record, Senate, March 18 1977, pg. 8158, Amendment n.93.
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The issue is still harshly debated, not only in the US. For example, public disclosure
of politicians’ tax files in Italy and the UK has recently given rise to numerous articles on
the popular press, with voters and opinion makers being mostly concerned that elected
officials who engage in relevant private activities may be diverted from being full-time
representatives.4
In this paper, we argue that when the political and market sectors are not mutually
exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert
in office. If high-ability citizens do not have to give up their private business, then they
will be more likely to run for election. For the same reason, however, they will also be
more likely to shirk once elected. We frame this intuition in a simple theoretical model
with two sectors: political and private. We assume that individuals are characterized by a
unique skill, ability, which is rewarded in the private but not in the political sector. Given
this setting, standard literature on political selection would predict adverse selection of
bad politicians (Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004). The main novelty of our model
is that politicians can work in either sector or in both. This departure comes with two
main implications. First, the traditional assumption that the opportunity cost of running
for office is higher for high-ability individuals may not be true anymore. In particular, if
the marginal returns from ability in the market are larger after election (for instance, if a
skilled lawyer, as opposed to a mediocre one, were able to procure new clients because of
the networks and visibility he gains while in office), then also high-skilled citizens may want
to enter politics. Second, as far as the parliament salary is paid whether elected officials
work hard or not, a moral hazard problem arises because politicians with potentially higher
outside income may prefer to exert less effort in parliament and more in the market. Voters
may then find themselves constrained to the following two options: either vote for a low-
ability but high-effort candidate, or for a high-ability but low-effort candidate.
The main ideas in the model are confronted with a unique dataset about the mem-
bers of the Italian Parliament which, with more than 900 representatives, is one of the
largest assemblies in the world. The dataset contains individual information on absences
in electronic voting, bills as main sponsor, and extensive details on pre-election and outside
income from 1996 to 2006. The main results show that although there is a drop in market
income following an election, most politicians still earn a considerable amount of money
4“On. Bongiorno scelga: o fa il deputato o l’avvocato”, Corriere della Sera Magazine, August 10,
2006; “Paid-up Members”, The Guardian, March 28, 2005.
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by working in the private sector (33% of total income while in office). In particular, we
find that differences in market income are amplified after election, the elasticity of outside
income with respect to pre-election income being equal to 1.33. This evidence supports
the idea that there is a relative advantage from election for high-ability citizens in terms
of outside income, which might explain why they decide to enter politics. Accordingly, we
find that when compared to the rest of the Italian population, before entering parliament
politicians belonged to the upper tail of the income distribution, the gap varying from
+18% to +63% across the quantiles of the joint distribution.
At the same time, politicians with higher outside income are less committed to par-
liamentary activity in terms of voting attendance and number of proposed bills. One
standard deviation of outside income (213,000 euros) is associated with a +3.9 percentage
points of the absenteeism rate in electronic votes (with respect to a 33% average) and -0.77
bills (with respect to a 10.5 average). A similar effect is detected when outside income
is replaced with pre-election income (+6.5 percentage points of the absenteeism rate and
-0.41 bills for one standard deviation, i.e., 138,000 euros), which is a better measure for
individual ability and a predictor of outside income opportunities while in office.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we present the theoretical framework. In Section 4, we describe
the data. In Section 5, we present the estimation results concerning the link between
parliamentary effort and outside income. In Section 6, we present empirical evidence on
the selection into parliament. We conclude with Section 7.
2 Related Literature
Outside employment has not received in the political economy literature the same attention
it attracted in the public debate. Models that predict adverse selection in politics (Besley,
2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004) are based on the assumption that the private and political
sectors are mutually exclusive, and that low-quality individuals have a lower opportunity
cost of running for office.5 Our framework can be considered as an extension of this
literature to the case where citizens can enter politics and work in the market at the same
time. We also closely relate to Mattozzi and Merlo (2007a) when they emphasize the role
5Messner and Polborn (2004) come to a similar conclusion, although in their case the rationale for
adverse selection is that high-quality citizens free-ride on low-quality ones, as for the former the attrac-
tiveness of public office is low.
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of the public office in signaling ability or establishing a network that could be helpful in the
private sector. In their model, however, the two options of being a politician or working
in a perfectly competitive market are not simultaneously available. Because of that, some
high-ability citizens decide to serve for a short period, after which they leave parliament
and capitalize on their political experience.
Some authors have considered honesty, in addition to ability, as a desirable attribute
of politicians (e.g., Caselli and Morelli, 2004). Others, instead, have focused on commit-
ment. Besley (2004), for example, shows that paying politicians better will improve their
performance, because the salary of a politician plays an efficiency-wage role. Conversely,
Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) show situations where increasing politicians’ reward lowers
candidate quality. In our framework, we also focus on commitment in political life, but
we abstract from honesty as we cannot observe an empirical counterpart for this.
Our paper is also conceptually related to the theoretical literature on dual job incentives
in health care systems, where individual dedication prevents public-service physicians
from referring patients to their private practices (Biglaiser and Ma, 2007) and selects
altruistic physicians into the public sector (Ma, 2007). In this sense, our framework
could be extended to other public offices, not necessarily elective, like judges, academics,
and physicians, the common element with politicians being that they can round up their
personal income, otherwise made of a fixed pay, by providing services in the private sector.
As individual-level data on politicians have become available, a conspicuous empirical
literature has started growing. One of the first papers to use a large individual-level
dataset is Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005), who find that congressional experience in
the US significantly increases post-congressional wages, both in the private and the public
sector. Keane and Merlo (2007) further extend the analysis by assessing the impact of
some specific policies on the quality of politicians. Interestingly, they find that restricting
private sector employment after leaving Congress, like precluding employment in firms
that rely heavily on government contracts, induces politicians who least value legislative
accomplishments to leave the Congress. Dal Bo’, Dal Bo’, and Snyder (2007) also use data
from the US Congress to document patterns and profiles of political dynasties. Finally,
Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaja (2006) use data from Russian gubernatorial elections
to show that in immature democracies businessmen run for public office to gain direct
control over certain policies.
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There is also an established literature in political science addressing the issue of legis-
lators’ personal finances. Among the others, Fiorina (1994) shows that the professional-
ization of the legislative office in the US (i.e., the fact that it became a full-time job) made
it relatively harder for the Republican Party to recruit high-quality candidates, because
it traditionally recruited businessmen and lawyers. Not surprisingly, Rosenson (2007)
find that senators who earned more honoraria were less likely to vote for a tightening of
outside income limits legislation. Another strand of literature has focused on legislator
voting.6 Particularly close to our paper is Lott (1990), who finds that the possibility of
being employed in the government after retiring from Congress reduces shirking in voting,
otherwise decreasing in the proximity of new elections.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there are neither theoretical nor empirical
studies assessing the implications of outside income on both politicians’ effort and selection,
and the way these two dimensions relate to each other.
3 Theoretical Framework
The following model provides a framework for evaluating the consequences of outside
income opportunities on politicians’ ex-ante selection and ex-post behavior, and it is meant
to set the stage for the empirical analysis.
3.1 Setup
We investigate the determinants of citizens’ decision to self-select into politics. Assume
to observe a population of individuals with ability a, uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, a¯]. Ability is valued by the market as M(a), that is, every individual with ability a˜
can get a market income equal to M(a˜) if he decides to work full-time in the private
sector. This sector is meritocratic and attaches a positive value to skills (i.e., M ′(.) > 0).
The alternative option is to become a politician. The rewards from a political career in
parliament are both financial and psychological. On the financial side, we assume that the
remuneration is equal toW (the salary of the members of parliament) and independent of
ability or performance, since we do not generally observe high-powered incentive schemes in
politics (Besley, 2004). On the psychological side, positive payoffs (ego rents) accrue both
from being a politician and from doing politics. Being a member of parliament gratifies
6See Bender and Lott (1996) for a review.
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people because of the influence, celebrity, and power consciousness that comes with it.
Doing politics (i.e., devoting time to the political office) gratifies people because they can
fulfill their ideological goals. In other words, we assume that ego rents from becoming a
politician (R) are made up of both payoffs attached to the position itself (R1) and payoffs
attached to the things that can be done (R2). This distinction makes it evident that one
can obtain some ego rents by simply becoming a member of parliament, while in order to
obtain some additional rewards one has to invest time and effort into political life.
In our model, the main departure from the rest of the literature is that members of
parliament can also earn money in the private sector while in office. Outside income is
a function P (a) strictly increasing in ability (P ′(.) > 0). Since time is a scarce resource,
if politicians are devoting part of their time to making outside income, their effort in
political activities, as well as the rewards from doing politics R2, will be lower. Formally,
if we define e ∈ {0, 1} as the effort put forth into parliamentary activities, the net payoff
of becoming a politician is
pi(a) = R1 + eR2 +W + (1− e)P (a)−M(a), (1)
which is equal to the sum of all financial and psychological rewards while in office minus
the opportunity cost of becoming a politician M(a).7
Decisions take place in two stages. In the first stage each individual, according to his
own ability, decides whether to enter politics or not. To focus on this self-selection decision,
like Besley (2004), we abstract from the role of political parties and voters in determining
the quality of elected politicians. In doing so, we make the simplified assumption that the
set of elected politicians is a random draw from all those willing to serve. Most papers
(e.g., Caselli and Morelli, 2004) assume that voters always prefer high-ability candidates.
Others, like Mattozzi and Merlo (2007b), argue that political parties may deliberately
choose to recruit only mediocre politicians because they face the competition of a lobbying
sector which pays higher wages. It is important to notice, however, that for our model to
work, we simply need parties or voters to be supplied-constrained by the pool of candidates.
Finally, in the second stage each individual who has chosen to become a politician
decides whether to put effort into parliamentary activities (e = 1) or not (e = 0).
7For the sake of simplicity, we only consider a binary effort. Our model could be generalized to the
continuous case but, since the payoff function is linear in effort, the main results would remain unchanged.
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3.2 Positive Predictions
As a benchmark, it is useful to derive a solution for the simple case where, like in traditional
literature on political selection, the possibility of earning outside income is ruled out (i.e.,
P (a) = 0 ∀a). In this situation, as long as there are positive ego rents from doing politics
(R2 > 0), effort is always equal to 1; the payoff of becoming a politician is equal to its
opportunity cost if R1 + R2 + W = M(a). Clearly, only individuals with ability lower
than a1 = M
−1(R1 + R2 + W ) decide to become politicians. Excluding the two trivial
equilibria in which all citizens become politicians (a1 > a¯) or nobody becomes a politician
(a1 ≤ 0), the adverse selection of bad politicians (i.e., negative hierarchical sorting) is the
main prediction. This is the result of traditional models: high-ability individuals prefer
to stay away from politics because of the high opportunity cost of becoming a politician.
Things change if P (a) is allowed. Outside income affects both the ex ante decision
to enter politics and the ex post decision to exert effort in political life. Let’s start with
the second-stage decision about e, which is relevant only for those who decide to become
politicians. In this case, only members of parliament for whom R1 + R2 + W ≥ R1 +
W + P (a), i.e., with ability lower than a∗ = P−1(R2), put forth effort into legislative
activity (e = 1). This is a moral hazard problem due to the fact that a time constraint
creates a trade-off between legislative effort and outside income. Because of higher outside
opportunities, skilled individuals have an incentive to exert lower effort in political life and
split their time between politics and the private sector.8 This simple framework comes
with a first testable prediction.
Prediction 1 High-ability politicians (a ≥ a∗) exert lower effort in parliamentary activity
than low-ability politicians (a < a∗).
Going back to the first-stage decision of entering politics, it is useful to look separately
at citizens with a ∈ [0, a∗) and citizens with a ∈ [a∗, a¯]. The former weigh the benefit
(R1 +R2 +W ) against the opportunity cost M(a). For them, the net payoff of becoming
a politician is
pi1(a) = R1 +R2 +W −M(a). (2)
8We are assuming that voters cannot punish low-effort politicians. For instance, because of the electoral
rule or because they possess less than full information. Note also that the threat of not being reelected is
less binding for high-quality politicians, since they have better outside options in the market.
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Their decision is the same as under the traditional assumption of having no outside income,
because a moral hazard problem does not arise.9 These citizens become politicians only
if a ∈ [0, a1), where again a1 = M
−1(R1 +R2 +W ). In the interval a ∈ [0, a
∗), pi1(a) has
either no zeros or a unique zero at a1, after which it changes from positive to negative.
Hence, in this subsample of citizens we observe three cases:
A. everybody becomes a politician (if a1 > a
∗);
B. nobody becomes a politician (if a1 ≤ 0);
C. there is negative hierarchical sorting (if 0 < a1 ≤ a
∗), i.e., citizens in [0, a1) become
politicians and citizens in [a1, a¯] do not.
Now focus on the first-stage decision of entering politics made by citizens with a ∈
[a∗, a¯]. For them, the moral hazard problem is at stake. They weigh the benefits of
becoming a politician (R1 + P (a) + W ) against the opportunity cost M(a). Their net
payoff of entering politics is
pi2(a) = R1 + P (a) +W −M(a), (3)
which increases (decreases) as long as P ′(a) > M ′(a) ∀a (P ′(a) < M ′(a) ∀a). If the
marginal return to ability for outside income is greater than the marginal return to abil-
ity for market income, the net payoff of becoming a politician increases with ability. An
intuitive motivation for P ′(a) being greater than M ′(a) comes from Mattozzi and Merlo
(2007a). Politicians are typically under the spotlight. Hence, by entering politics high-
ability citizens have relatively better chances to reveal their specific skills. At the same
time, they might be able to exploit the political position to establish a network of ac-
quaintances, this network being stronger the higher the ability of the politician. Note also
that, since P (a∗) = R2, we observe that pi2(a
∗) = R1 + R2 +W −M(a
∗) = pi1(a
∗). From
the above discussion about individuals with a ∈ [0, a∗), we know that pi1(a
∗) can be either
positive (case A) or negative (cases B and C). In the interval a ∈ [a∗, a¯], pi2(a) has either
no zeros or a unique zero at a2, which is defined as: R1+W +P (a2) = M(a2). The above
three cases are then split into six possible equilibria:
A1. citizens in [0, a2) become politicians and citizens in [a2, a¯] do not (if a2 ≤ a¯);
9To rule out the uninteresting case where moral hazard does not come into play, we only consider the
case of a∗ ∈ (0, a¯).
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A2. everybody becomes a politician (if a2 ≥ a¯);
B1. citizens in [0, a2) do not become politicians and citizens in [a2, a¯] do (if a2 ≤ a¯);
B2. nobody becomes a politician (if a2 ≥ a¯);
C1. citizens in [0, a1) become politicians and citizens in [a1, a¯] do not (if a2 ≥ a¯);
C2. citizens in [0, a1) and [a2, a¯] become politicians and citizens in [a1, a2) do not (if
a2 ≤ a¯).
Excluding the trivial equilibria in which everybody becomes a politician (A2) or nobody
does (B2), we can observe either positive hierarchical sorting (B1) or negative hierarchical
sorting (A1 and C1), as well as an equilibrium in which citizens in the two tails of the
ability distribution become politicians, while those in the middle do not (C2). The above
four nontrivial equilibria are illustrated in Figures 1 through 4 (solid lines for the baseline
case).10 In case A1 (Figure 1), all low-ability but high-effort citizens enter politics, as
well as a fraction of high-ability but low-effort citizens. We observe adverse selection like
in the traditional literature, even though the cut-off ability level is a2 and not a1.
11 In
case B1 (Figure 2), all low-ability and potentially high-effort citizens do not enter politics,
since financial and psychological rewards are too low. However, thanks to outside income
and an increasing pi2(a), the citizens in the upper tail of the ability distribution find it
profitable to enter politics, even though they exert no effort in parliamentary activity. In
case C1 (Figure 3), we have exactly the same situation as in the traditional literature.
High-ability (and potentially low-effort) citizens stay away from politics, while only the
lower tail of the distribution finds it profitable to enter politics. The cut-off ability level
is a1 as in the baseline case with no outside income. Finally, in case C2 (Figure 4), the
trade-off between positive selection and moral hazard is even more apparent. Citizens in
the lower tail of the distribution enter politics and exert positive effort, while citizens in
the upper tail of the distribution enter politics but exert no effort.
We can now derive an additional prediction.
10In all of these figures, pi1(a) and pi2(a) are drawn as straight lines for simplicity, although they do not
necessarily need to be linear. The only assumption we need is that they are continuous and monotonic.
11The greater the level of outside income P (a) with respect to ego rents from doing politics R2, the
higher is a2 with respect to a1.
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Prediction 2 If P ′(a) < M ′(a) (sufficient but not necessary condition), we observe nega-
tive hierarchical sorting; if instead P ′(a) > M ′(a) (necessary but not sufficient condition),
also the very upper tail of the ability distribution may enter politics.
We are aware that positive selection into politics may arise for many other reasons. So
far, for example, we assumed R2 as constant, while the ego rents from doing politics may
be thought of as an increasing function of ability (the more skilled you are, the better you
accomplish your ideological goals). In this case, if R′2(a) < P
′(a), the predictions of our
framework would remain unchanged. On the contrary, if R′2(a) > P
′(a), positive sorting
could be completely explained by ego rents R2(a) instead of outside income opportunities
P (a), but then the prediction in terms of moral hazard would be reverted: high-ability
citizens would exert more effort than low-ability citizens. This gives even greater relevance
to testing Prediction 1 in the data. If high-ability citizens exert less effort once elected,
then they entered politics because of greater outside income opportunities.
At the same time, post-parliamentary returns might play an important role here (as
in Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007a; and Diermeier, Merlo and Keane, 2005). High-ability
candidates may run for politics even if outside income were not allowed, because serving
as a politician could boost private sector earnings after leaving office. There are a number
of features, nevertheless, that could not be completely addressed with post-parliamentary
revenues only. First, future returns might not be enough to compensate for the loss of
any private return for the period in office (at least four or five years). Second, they could
not explain why some high-ability citizens might come into politics for life. Last but not
least, post-parliamentary returns could not account for the moral hazard problem that
come with pursuing private activities while in office.12
To sum up, our framework shows that as soon as outside income is introduced into the
political selection mechanism, two main implications arise. First, there is a moral-hazard
effect. High-ability individuals who choose to become politicians have an incentive not to
exert effort in parliamentary activities, since they might spend their time to grasp outside
income opportunities. Second, there is a selection effect, where adverse selection of bad
politicians is no longer the only possible outcome. High-ability individuals may also find
12Another alternative explanation for the positive sorting equilibria may be that high-income candidates
have higher financial resources to cover the cost of an electoral campaign. For this reason, they would be
more likely to run for election. In countries where most of the electoral fund raising is made by parties,
like Italy, the relevance of this argument is lower.
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it convenient to enter politics as long as their outside income possibilities offset the greater
opportunity cost.
3.3 Normative Thoughts
The main purpose of the model was to set the stage for the empirical analysis, deriving
some positive predictions to be tested in the data. Nonetheless, we can derive some nor-
mative and policy thoughts as well. In the Appendix B, we formally discuss the normative
implications of our framework. Here, some main points deserve to be mentioned.
First, a normative discussion about the selection effect of outside income is relevant only
if political ability and market skills are positively correlated. We share this assumption
with the literature on political selection. In particular, we find it plausible to assume that
political competence and market skills are positively correlated (e.g., problem solving skills
increase productivity both in the market and in politics), even though such a correlation
might be far from perfect.
Second, the welfare comparison of situations with and without outside income is am-
biguous. If outside income comes with a selection gain (e.g., cases B1, C2 and, under
some circumstances, A1), this may more than compensate the cost of shirking, leading
to a welfare improvement. If outside income comes instead with no selection gain (e.g.,
cases C1 and, under some other circumstances, A1), the cost of shirking always produces a
welfare loss. From society’s point of view, then, it is not clear whether outside income in-
creases or decreases welfare. Furthermore, our framework only looks at the time constraint
problem of outside income and does not consider the additional problems of “conflict of
interest” (i.e., the fact that members of parliament with relevant outside activities might
respond more to their private interests than to their electoral constituencies; see Stigler,
1967). We made that choice because in our data we have measures of outside income and
parliamentary effort, but not honesty. If outside income comes not only with a shirking
cost but also with an honesty cost, the previous policy conclusions might change in favor
of a stricter regulation.
Another normative thought would regard the question of whether alternative policy-
induced equilibria can be found, like raising the parliamentary salary W , which always
outperform the equilibria with outside income in terms of social welfare. If outside income
were not allowed, a mere increase in W only would never convince citizens in the very
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upper tail of the ability distribution to enter politics, unless the parliamentary wage was
set equal to M(a¯) − R1 − R2, i.e., to the highest wage in the private market minus the
ego rents from becoming a politician. This extremely high level of W may not be feasible
for financial and political considerations, or there might be a negative reputation effect
from increasing the statutory salary.13 In these cases, allowing outside income would be
the only way to make high-ability citizens enter politics.
If outside income were allowed, instead, would a policy increasing W be desirable?
Our framework shows that this is not necessarily the case. If we look at Figures 1 through
4 (dashed lines), an increase in the compensation of politicians implies a parallel shift
upward of the payoff function. Only in cases A1 and C1 (negative hierarchical sorting)
there would be an unambiguous improvement in the average quality of candidates (a1 and
a2 shift to the right), although this might come at the cost of higher moral hazard (in
case A2, or in case C1 if a′1 > a
∗). In case B1 (positive hierarchical sorting) there is a
unambiguous reduction in the average quality of candidates (a′2 < a2). Finally, in case
C2 (two-tail sorting) there is an ambiguous change in the average quality of candidates
(as a′2 < a2 but a
′
1 > a1). Contrarily to Besley (2004) and Caselli and Morelli (2004), in
our framework paying a politician more may decrease the average quality of politicians,
because it may induce some low-ability citizens, who would have otherwise stayed away
from politics, to run for elections.
4 The Data
In what follows, we confront Prediction 1 and Prediction 2 with a dataset about the
members of the Italian Parliament (House of Representatives and Senate) for the period
1996-2006 (legislatures XIII and XIV). Although the original dataset also included legis-
latures X (1987-1992), XI (1992-1994) and XII (1994-1996), we could not use XI and XII
because they only lasted for two years and the information about outside income could
not be recovered; we then dropped legislature X to avoid time discontinuities.
We have two reasons, rather than just data availability, to believe that the Italian
Parliament is particularly suited for this type of empirical analysis. First, it is one of the
largest assemblies in the world, with more than 900 representatives (630 deputies and 315
senators), against 535 in the US, 575 in France, and 659 in the UK. Second, although it has
13As in Frey (1997) or Benabou and Tirole (2006).
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long been recognized as an assembly mostly composed of professional politicians, many
outsiders entered the political arena after the majoritarian reform of the electoral system
in 1994. This increased the heterogeneity of its composition, particularly reinforcing the
representation of businessmen and other citizens coming from the private market.
The dataset contains individual income information coming from yearly tax returns.
We also have information over the legislative term on absences (the number of electronic
votes not attended without any legitimate reason), and the number of bills as main spon-
sor over the legislative term.14 Finally, we have complete detail on the following political
and demographic characteristics: political experience (this includes being a member of
the directive office of a party at the local, regional and national level; past and current
appointments as minister or state secretary; past appointments at the local government
level, such as municipality, province or region councillor; past appointments in parlia-
ment); appointments in parliament (whether or not a politician is in a second committee
and whether or not he is president or vice president of the parliament or of one committee);
political party of affiliation; electoral system under which the politician was elected (ma-
joritarian or proportional); the district of election; coalition type (whether they support
the government or not); and some self-declared demographics (age, gender, place of birth,
place of residence, level of education, field of education, previous job, marital status, and
number of children).
The sources we used to collect this information included: the Annals of the Italian
Parliament (La Navicella) for the demographic information;15 the archive of tax returns
for members of Italian Parliament to find the individual income information (except the
salary from parliament); the internet archive of bills for legislative activity;16 and the
Italian Parliament Statistical Office for statistics on individual attendance and salaries.
A brief remark is needed on the distinction between earned and unearned income. In
the theoretical framework, we implicitly assumed outside income to always be earned in-
come, not unearned. The main force driving moral hazard was in fact the possibility of
allocating time, otherwise devoted to the public office, to private activities. In the data
14Attendance does not refer to any committee’s activity. Cases of non-attendance because of parliament
missions and cabinet meetings are not counted as absences. Electronic votes account for about 90% of
total votes (almost the totality if the vote were on a final bill’s approval), the rest being held with hand
counting. Some measurement error may arise from the forbidden practice of multiple voting.
15I Deputati e i Senatori del Parlamento Repubblicano, edited by Editoriale Italiana.
16Available at: http://www.senato.it/ricerche/sDDLa/nuova.ricerca.
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we only observe the total income, which is the sum of property rents, labor income from
entrepreneurial and self-employed activities, and labor earnings for dependent employ-
ees.17 Property rents, however, do not represent a significant share of individual income.18
Therefore, the total income can be taken as a good measure for earned income. Moreover,
it is important to remark that even if total income were not a perfect proxy for earned
income, it could still be a good measure of politicians’ private activities, as far as unearned
income, like property rents, also requires some management time.
4.1 The Italian Institutional Framework
In 1994, there was a change in the Italian electoral system. While politicians in previous
legislatures were elected through a proportional system, those in legislatures XII (1994-
1996), XIII (1996-2001), and XIV (2001-2006) were instead elected through a mixed system
(25% proportional and 75% majoritarian). Legislatures XI and XII lasted less than the
statutory duration (two years instead of five) and early elections were called. The number
of seats (945) has remained unchanged throughout all terms: 630 are in the House of
Representatives and 315 are in the Senate.
Another important point concerns the change in the party system composition. Before
1994, when the majoritarian electoral system was introduced, most of the parties gravi-
tated around a strong but unstable center coalition that held power with no interruption
since 1948. After 1994, new political actors joined the party system following the cor-
ruption scandal which reached many formerly established political leaders (the judicial
investigation was called “Mani Pulite”). At the same time, many parties changed their
names and compositions to adjust to the bipolar framework induced by the majoritarian
system (the so-called “Seconda Repubblica”). Hence, since the data used in this paper
only refer to Legislatures XIII and XIV, they are homogeneous with respect to both the
electoral rule and the party system.
17Dividends and capital gains are not reported in the tax declaration since they are taxed as they are
realized. The only exception is represented by the revenues from significant (5% if listed in the stock
market, 25% if not) financial shares (in the measure of 51%). In this case, dividends and capital gains
could also be considered time consuming and then assimilated to labor income.
18The tax returns’ archive of the Italian Parliament contains information about the number of properties,
but not their value. We checked on a random sample of politicians and we found that properties are not
considerable in number. Of course, this could be because they were listed under the names of relatives,
but this would not bias the tax declaration.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of politicians in the dataset. The sample is made
up of 1,763 members of parliament, with repeated observations for those who held two con-
secutive appointments (415 individuals). The majority are male (90%) and the mean age
at the beginning of the legislative term is 51 years. Before being appointed, many politi-
cians were lawyers (14%), academics (10%), entrepreneurs (10%), self-employed (9%), and
managers (9%), that is, they held typically private professions.19 It is worth pointing out
that elected individuals exhibit a percentage of university level education (72%) consider-
ably higher than the rest of the Italian population (10% in 2002 for the 25 to 64 year-old
population).20 At the same time, 11% of politicians in the sample were completely new
to politics when elected to parliament; that is, they had never before had any previous
appointment in parliament, government, local government, and political party. On the
contrary, 55% had at least one previous appointment in parliament, 19% had been ap-
pointed as government minister or deputy minister, 57% had an appointment in a local
government, and 51% had an executive appointment in a political party. For the reasons
explained in the previous section, repeat appointments in parliament are not frequent (at
least for the back-benchers): the average number of terms is 1.03 (2.03 including the term
of election) and the number of years served is 3.26.
Measuring the effort exerted by a member of parliament is not an easy task. There
are many dimensions over which a politician might reveal his commitment to the public
office. Being aware of these shortcomings, we measure effort in parliamentary activity
through absences in electronic votes that lacked a legitimate reason, and, as a further
check, through the number of bills proposed as main sponsor. While bills represent a
main duty of a legislator, it is not clear whether they are the outcome of the effort of the
politician himself, or of his own staff. For this reason, although we will often refer to bills
for comparison exercises, we will mostly focus our analysis on absences. Other measures
could have been used, like the the number of legislative achievements, or the number of
appointments in parliament (as president or vice president of a branch of the parliament
or a committee) or in government (like minister or deputy minister). The problem with
these measures is that they could be confounded with ability, or they could be influenced
19For 71 politicians who declared to have retired before election, we re-imputed the previous job with
the main activity before retirement.
20Source: Education at a Glance, OECD, 2004.
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by a bargaining process within the party which the politician belongs to. This is not the
case with absences and, to a reasonable extent, with bills.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for absences over the legislative term, standardized
by the total number of votes.21 The average rate of absenteeism in the scheduled votes
is 33%. Excluding army officers, blue collars and students for whom we have few obser-
vations, absences seem to be considerable for lawyers (37%), journalists (37%), academics
(37%), top civil servants (36%), magistrates (36%), entrepreneurs (34%), physicians (34%),
and managers (34%). With the exception of top civil servants and magistrates, lack of
attendance is higher for those professions for which formal or substantial incompatibilities
do not apply, i.e., for those who could keep running their pre-election business. On the
other side, teachers (28%), political party officials (27%), and white collars (26%), seem
particularly committed to parliamentary activity.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the number of bills. The average number of bills
proposed in a legislative term is 10.48. Lawyers (12.97), magistrates (12.95), physicians
(12.30), and teachers (12.06) are the most prolific categories. It is not surprising that
politicians with a specific legal background show a relative advantage at writing bills.
The dataset contains the following information for individual income of all members of
parliament: the gross salary from serving in parliament and the gross total income, both
from the first to the fourth year in the legislative term (for those serving a consecutive
mandate, we also observe the income in the fifth year of the legislative term).22 We
compute outside income as the difference between gross total income and gross parliament
salary (which is fixed within a term unless some inflation adjustments are applied) in a
specific year. For freshmen, we also observe the total income for the year before being
elected (the first tax return deposited). Since absences and bills are measured per term,
we then take the average of the outside income between the second and the fourth year.23
Table 4 summarizes these income variables.24 The average total income of a represen-
21Actual number of votes ranges from 0 to 34,577, over a total number of votes varying from 6,418 to
34,966 depending on the legislature and the branch of the parliament.
22Elections in Italy are usually held in the spring. In July, all members of parliament must submit their
tax declaration, which refers to the previous fiscal year. We also have net total income, but, as far as this
includes tax deductions, we prefer to use the gross total income.
23Tax returns refer to the fiscal year, from January to December. For this reason, we cannot recover
the information for the first six months in the term (a term usually starts in the late spring).
24We are aware that, because of tax evasion, income measures might underestimate the actual income.
We believe this problem to be less serious here since politicians’ tax files are subject to public disclosure.
If not, any evidence we might find on moral hazard could be biased upward if tax evasion (and then
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tative is 185,700 euros; 124,800 euros come as the parliament salary, but outside income
is not an insignificant component (60,900 euros, 32.8% of total income).25 The standard
deviation of outside income is particularly high (212,900 euros), and the maximum value
is 5,419,100 euros. In the second part of the table, we focus only on the sample of fresh-
men, for whom we also have information on the income of the year before elections. On
average, citizens who then become politicians could count on 103,300 euros per year, with
a standard deviation of 138,000 euros and a maximum value of 2,663,600 euros. Table
5 also shows that politicians with higher outside income were lawyers (113,500 euros),
entrepreneurs (106,600 euros), and academics (109,300 euros).
5 Empirical Findings on Moral Hazard
In this section we present empirical evidence about the correlation between outside income
and effort in parliamentary activity. From the theoretical framework we know that this
relationship can be rewritten in the following reduced form:
eit = γPit + βXit + υi + it, (4)
where eit is a measure of effort (absence rate), Pit is the outside income, Xit some indi-
vidual covariates, and υi and it are error terms (time invariant and variant, respectively)
capturing any other unobservable component which is for the moment assumed to be un-
correlated with Pit. In Table 6 we present the estimates for this correlation over a final
sample of 1,624 observations, where individuals with missing values for any control vari-
able, life senators, ministers, and outliers with more than two million euros of outside
income were excluded.
Since the absenteeism rate is bounded between 0 and 1, we use the GLM estimator pro-
posed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). After controlling for a large set of characteristics
(previous job, gender, age, education, political experience, political party, macro-region
underreporting) were higher for politicians with high outside income. Selection mechanisms, instead,
would remain unchanged as far as the degree of tax evasion is constant before and after election. This is
a particularly plausible assumption if candidates anticipate during the electoral campaign the imminent
public disclosure.
25In addition to the salary, a politician receives from the parliament 206.58 euros (at 2004 prices) for
each voting day. This is meant to be a reimbursement for accommodation expenses in Rome, and it does
not appear in the tax return (as any other office-related benefit). Considering that the average number
of voting days per month is 12, the variable component of the remuneration of an elected official in Italy
amounts to 29,747 euros per year (23.7% of the main salary).
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of election, term in office, and being in the government coalition) we find that absences
significantly increase along the outside income distribution. In particular, one standard
deviation of outside income (212,900 euros) is associated with +3.9 percentage points in
absenteeism, which corresponds to +11.8% of the mean absenteeism (33%).26
These numbers are particularly significant from an economic point of view. First,
because it is likely that politicians with higher ability may find a way to perform both
political and private activities without interference. If we then asked a random politician
to make the same amount of outside income as a high-ability one, he would probably
need to further reduce more his voting attendance. If this is the case, although γˆ could
not have a causal interpretation (i.e., cov(Pit, υi) 6= 0), it would still be a lower bound of
the true parameter. Second, it is relevant because 13.4% of politicians have a source of
outside income greater than 100 thousand euros, 5.3% greater than 200 thousand euros,
and almost 2% more than 500 thousand euros (see Table 5). Even if not for everybody, it
seems that a time constraint problem arises for a relevant number of politicians.
Estimate in column I might just capture a pure mechanical effect due to the time
constraint. In column II, we then replace outside income with pre-election income Mi
(available for 767 freshmen):
ei = γMi + βXi + υi. (5)
Being pre-determined, Mi can be considered a proxy for ability in the market, and then
be used for a direct test of Prediction 1, i.e., high-ability politicians exerting a lower effort
in parliamentary activity. Results confirm Prediction 1 of the theoretical framework. We
find in fact that one standard deviation of pre-election income (138,000 euros) is associated
with +6.5 percentage points in absenteeism (+19.2% with respect to the mean).
In order to detect heterogeneity in the correlation between absences and market income,
we perform quantile regressions using the same control variables as in Table 6. Figure 5
shows the estimated coefficients for the outside income variable at different quantiles τ (γτ ).
The time constraint actually increases across the absenteeism distribution. In particular,
an additional amount of outside income reduces the participation in voting especially when
absences are already high; at lower levels, instead, additional outside income does not come
26We also tried with a quadratic term for the outside income to capture non-linearities, but it turned
out to be not statistically significant. As a further robustness check, we run the same estimates on a
sub-sample of politicians for whom there are no formal incompatibilities between the public office and
the previous job (managers, entrepreneurs, self-employed, journalists, academics, and doctors). We found
that the results were qualitatively identical.
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with a relevant reduction in voting attendance. This suggests that the time constraint
becomes particularly binding when the time not devoted to parliamentary activity (e.g.,
leisure) is no longer sufficient for cultivating outside interests. Figure 6 shows instead the
estimated coefficients of the pre-election income variable at different quantiles. In this case
the moral hazard does not arise at all for the lower half of the absenteeism distribution.
This means that there is a relevant fraction of hard-working politicians for whom ability,
and thus outside income opportunities, have no effect on parliamentary effort (e.g., because
their ego rents from doing politics, R2, are considerably higher with respect to the other
politicians). However, for politicians with higher absenteeism rates we still observe a moral
hazard problem.
In Table 7 we run a robustness check for the presence of moral hazard by replacing
absences with the number of bills. Although, as we said before, bills may not exactly reflect
individual effort, they still represent a key duty of an elected official, i.e., the legislative
one. As we can see in column I, the number of bills decreases along the outside income
distribution. In particular, one standard deviation of outside income (212,900 euros) is
associated with a decrease by 0.77 in the number of bills, which corresponds to 7.3% of
the mean (10.5). In column II, we replace outside income with pre-election income, and
also find that one standard deviation of pre-election income (138,000 euros) is associated
with an increase of 0.41 bills (5.2% with respect to the mean).
6 Empirical Findings on Sorting
Given the nature of the dataset, we cannot test the selection implications of our model in
a straightforward way, as the regulation of outside income in Italy never changed during
the period of time covered by the dataset. Nevertheless, something interesting can still be
obtained from the data.
We start by comparing the pre-election income distribution for the politicians in our
sample with the income distribution of the Italian population. The latter comes from
the Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW), which is a representative sample of the
Italian population.27 Since almost every politician in the sample was employed before
appointment (except 2 students and 71 retired individuals), we only selected individuals
27The SHIW only provides net (instead of gross) total income. We recovered the same measure for
politicians by subtracting the net tax from the gross pre-election income.
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in the Italian population who were employed at the reference pre-election years (1995 and
2000). Because of differences in the coding, we could match managers, entrepreneurs,
self-employed, lawyers, white collars, teachers, and blue collars only. To make the exercise
more meaningful, we further restricted the joint sample to individuals of working age (25-
60).28 We also accounted for under-reporting in the SHIW by increasing the income of
the Italian population by 30% (half an increment for employees).29
As we can see in Figure 7, politicians’ income distribution is located to the right with
respect to the population distribution. For some members of parliament the pre-election
income was extremely high, with only a small fraction below the median of the national
distribution. We test the significance of these distributional differences in Table 8, which
reports the estimates of a quantile regression over a joint distribution of the two samples:
ln(Mi) = ατPoli + βXi + υi, (6)
where ln(Mi) is the logarithm of the net total income (the pre-election income for freshmen
politicians), Xi is a set of all the control variables we could match between the two datasets
(age, gender, year dummies, type of job, and education), Poli a dummy equal to one if the
individual is a politician, and zero otherwise, and υi an error component.
30 The coefficient
ατ is always positive and significant at any quantile (see column I), although the premium
for future politicians declines when we test it at lower quantiles (from +63% in the 90th
quantile to +18%in the 10th quantile). In column II we restrict the joint sample to males
between 40 and 60, with at least a B.A. degree, and excluded blue collars, teachers, and
white collars, to focus the comparison more specifically on the upper tale of the income
distribution. In this case, the gap is lower, but still positive and statistically significant
at the highest quantiles. As far as pre-election income can be interpreted as a proxy for
ability, this evidence makes it difficult to conclude that citizens appointed to parliament
were the outcome of an adverse selection mechanism only.
Our theoretical framework offers a possible explanation to this puzzle. In what follows,
we decompose the gain from election into its two main financial components: parliament
salary and outside income. We then clean the original sample of politicians from those
28The minimum age for being candidate in the House of Representatives is 25 years, 40 in the Senate.
29See Brandolini (1999) for a detailed analysis of under-reporting in the SHIW. We did not make the
same correction for politicians’ income as we observe their true tax returns.
30Following Mansky and Lerman (1977), we control for choice-based sampling by using the Pesofl
weights (the inverse of the sampling probability) available in the SHIW dataset, and a weight equal to
one for the politicians (the whole universe of members of parliament).
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whose previous job was as army official, student, political party official, trade unionist,
white collar, blue collar, and teacher. In this way we are left with a sample of individuals
(528) whose observed market income is more likely to reflect individual talent. Table 9
summarizes pre-election income, total income while in office, parliament salary, and outside
income (all gross) by quintiles of the income distribution before election. It is easy to see
that in every quintile, the average total income while in office exceeds the pre-election
income, i.e., all members of parliament (except 54) had a pecuniary gain from being
elected (from an average of +318% in the first quintile to +18% in the highest quintile).
However, the absolute value and composition of this gain are significantly different at
different levels of pre-election income. As it can be seen in Figure 8, citizens with a low
income before election gain the most because of the salary they receive once in office (an
average of +278% for citizens in the lowest quintile), which more than offsets the drop
in market income (outside income being only 40% of pre-election income, with only 13
individuals experiencing an increase). On the contrary, citizens with a high income before
the election gain because they can keep running their private business (for citizens in the
highest quintile outside income is 77% of pre-election income). In fact, if they had had to
rely on parliament salary only, they would have experienced a 59% income loss. What is
particularly important is that the ratio between outside income and pre-election income
increases as we move up in the pre-election income distribution. This is evocative of the
fact that high-ability citizens have a relative advantage over election in terms of outside
income, i.e., the marginal return to ability for market income is greater when appointed
than when not appointed (P ′(a) > M ′(a)). This is a necessary condition for observing
high-ability individuals entering politics (Prediction 2).
In Table 10 we formally test this hypothesis by regressing the log of the outside income
over the log of pre-election income:
ln(Pi) = µln(Mi) + βXi + υi, (7)
where µ represents the standard elasticity parameter ( %∆Pi
%∆Mi
). In case µˆ was higher than
one, this would mean that a percentage difference in pre-election income (%∆Mi) trans-
lates, once elected, into a more than proportional difference in outside income (%∆Pi),
i.e., being elected amplifies the differences in market income. The final sample over which
we estimate equation (7) is made of 506 individuals for whom we have non-missing values
for any variable, and the standard outliers were excluded. As we can see in column I,
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the elasticity is significantly higher than one at 1% level (µˆOLS equal to 1.28) even after
controlling for the standard set of covariates.31 Politicians who had higher market returns
before election have a relative gain in terms of outside income.
One main problem with the estimate in column I, as well as with Figure 8, is that we
do not actually observe outside income opportunities P (a), but instead observe outside
income conditional to effort (1 − ei)Pi. For this reason, we need to include absences as
an additional control. Absences, however, are potentially endogenous with respect to
outside income and, even if it is not the main parameter of interest, it might introduce
an additional source of bias in the estimation. For this reason, we instrument it with
the time distance (in hours) between Rome, where the Parliament is located, and the
province of residence, where we assume politicians’ outside activity and personal interests
to be concentrated.32 This variable is likely to influence absences and, more importantly,
it is exogenous with respect to outside income for two main reasons. First, because the
equal distribution of representatives over the national territory ensures that it is not only
the citizens who live close to Rome who run for politics.33 Second, because politicians are
exempted from travel expenses (except when they travel by car) and then individual wealth
does not have any influence on commuting decisions. At the same time, the distance from
Rome does not affect outside income directly, but through absences only, as far as the
central geographical position of Rome guarantees that distance does not reflect different
regional economic conditions. As an example, Milan (one of the provinces with the highest
per-capita income) and Nuoro (one of the provinces with the lowest per-capita income)
share the same distance from Rome, which is 3:54 hours.
First-stage estimates in column II (province of residence available for 393 individuals
only) show that being resident in a province far from Rome has a negative and statistically
significant impact on absenteeism (-1.8 percentage points for each hour). The intuition
31The comparison between the pre-election and the post-election market incomemight be spurious in the
presence of favorable economic conditions specific to some professional categories in the related period. We
checked this possibility over the SHIW dataset, and found that entrepreneurs and self-employed actually
experienced an income increase at national level between 2003 and 2004, but this does not overlap with
the intervals over which we computed the elasticity (1995-1997 and 2000-2002). Before 2003, and for all
the other professional categories we could match, the time profile of income was instead flat.
32Time distance is computed as the time to get to Rome with the fastest mean of transportation between
car, airplane and train. It also accounts for the commuting time from the province of residence to the
nearest Alitalia flight or Trenitalia/Eurostar station, and daily frequencies (normalized to one for the car).
Time distance ranges from 1:12 in Latina to 5:54 hours in Cosenza (zero for those living in Rome).
3385% of the politicians live in the same region of election.
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is that politicians who live far from Rome find more costly to commute everyday. For
this reason, they commute less and attend a higher number of sessions. More impor-
tantly, second-stage estimates confirm the results in column I. Even after controlling for
absenteeism, the elasticity term is still greater than one (µˆIV equal to 1.33), although
less statistically significant. High-ability politicians have the opportunity after election to
reveal their skills to the market or, alternatively, they are better at exploiting the political
position for establishing acquaintances that might be useful in the outside work. In this
sense, our theoretical framework offers a reasonable explanation to the fact that some
members of parliament belonged to the upper tail of the income distribution before elec-
tion. It is the opportunity to earn outside income that make high-ability citizens willing
to stand for election.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of elected officials working in the private sector
while appointed in parliament. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that after
removing the mutual exclusiveness between the elective office and outside work, a moral
hazard problem arises which was not identified in the previous literature. On the other
hand, as long as high-ability citizens do not have to give up their private business, they
are more likely to run for election and adverse selection into politics is no longer the only
possible outcome.
Normative indications about the desirability of outside income are not straightfor-
ward. First, it is worth noticing that regulation would not be necessary if voters, through
elections, could perfectly select and monitor their representatives choosing the preferred
combination of ability and effort. This is unlikely, however, in the presence of asymmetric
information on voters’ side, or might be strongly influenced by the institutional setting,
like the party system or the electoral rule (see Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni,
2007). Second, normative implications crucially depend on how much ability can com-
pensate for effort (or vice versa). If these two attributes were complementary, then an
equilibrium in which low-ability but dedicated politicians come along with high-ability
but not fully committed politicians, might be preferable to a situation in which outside
income is limited or not allowed.
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Appendix A. Outside Income Regulation and Incom-
patibilities: Cross-Country Comparison
In this appendix we describe the regulation of outside income in the following three coun-
tries: the US, the UK, and Italy.
US - House of Representatives and Senate
In 1992 the House of Representatives adopted a strict ethic code, which incorporated the
contents of previous related bills, mainly in 1977, 1989 and 1991. According to these
guidelines, the amount of outside earned income that representatives and senior staff can
have in any calendar year is limited. The limit per year is 15% of the rate of pay for
Level II of the Executive Schedule in effect on January 1 of that year. The rate of pay for
Executive Level II in 2006 was $165,200. Accordingly, the outside earned income limit for
calendar year 2006 was $24,780.
These restrictions apply only to earned income, that is, employment, rather than in-
vestment income. The rule defines the term outside earned income as “wages, salaries,
fees, and other amounts received or to be received as compensation for personal services
actually rendered.”The rule specifically excludes: the individual’s congressional salary;
compensation for services rendered prior to coming to Congress or before the effective
date of the rule; amounts paid to a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan;
in the case of a family-controlled business or farm, amounts received in connection with
protecting or managing one’s investment as long as the personal services rendered do not
in themselves generate a significant amount of income; copyright royalties received from
established publishers under usual and customary contractual terms.
As for honoraria, until 1991 all the representatives, officers, and employees were free
to accept honoraria of up to $2,000 per speech, appearance, or article, subject only to
the outside earned income cap then effective for representatives. The Ethics Reform
Act of 1989 prohibited all members, officers, and employees of the House (as well as all
executive branch employees) from receiving any honoraria, as of January 1 1991. Similar
restrictions apply to teaching activities: members and covered employees may not teach
for compensation, unless they receive prior written permission from the Committee on
Standards.
Violation of these laws may lead to disciplinary action in the House and/or civil fines
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of up to $10,000 or the amount of compensation for the prohibited conduct, whichever is
greater. However, the statute specifically provides that any House Member or employee
who acts in good faith in accordance with a written advisory opinion from the Committee
on Standards shall not be subject to any sanction.
Identical restrictions apply to the US Senate.
UK - House of Commons and House of Lords
The UK system is based on the principles stated in the Code of Conduct, adopted by the
House of Commons on July 2005 and by the House of Lords in March 2002. These two set
of rules are quite similar. The set of incompatibilities is quite narrow and mainly concerns
public occupations. In particular, members may not simultaneously occupy the following
posts: membership in the armed forces, policemen, civil servants, certain judicial offices,
clergymen (except of non-conformist churches), peers, membership in a large number of
public boards and tribunals.
As for the possibility to carry out outside activities, the UK system provides for a
high degree of transparency. Members are required to register their pecuniary interests
in a Register of Members’ Interests. The duty of compiling the Register now rests with
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. The main purpose of the Register of
Members’ Interests is to provide information of any pecuniary interest or other material
benefit which a Member receives which might reasonably be thought by others to influence
his or her actions, speeches or votes in Parliament, or actions taken in his or her capacity
as a Member of Parliament.
According to the House of Lords Rule of Conduct, the following financial interests
are always relevant and therefore must be registered: any consultancy agreement under
which Members of the House provide parliamentary advice or services; employment or
any other financial interest in businesses involved in parliamentary lobbying on behalf
of clients, including public relations and law firms but Members of the House involved
with organizations that offer commercial lobbying services are not obliged to refrain from
participating in parliamentary business in connection with all clients of that organization
but only their personal clients; any remunerated service which Members of the House
provide by virtue of their position as members of Parliament, and the clients of any
such service; employment as a non-parliamentary consultant; remunerated directorship;
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regular remunerated employment (excluding occasional income from speeches, lecturing,
broadcasting and journalism); shareholdings amounting to a controlling interest; provision
by an outside body of secretarial and research assistance; visits with costs paid in the
United Kingdom and overseas, made as a member of Parliament, except any visits paid
for from public funds.
Further, the list above is not exhaustive. Relevant financial interests may also include
(depending on their significance): shareholdings not amounting to a controlling interest;
landholdings (excluding Members’ homes); the financial interests of a spouse or relative
or friend; hospitality or gifts given to a Member which could reasonably be regarded as
an incentive to support a particular cause or interest.
Interests that do not exceed 1% of the current parliamentary salary do not have to be
registered. Further, except for remuneration received by Members for advice in relation
to parliamentary matters, Members of the House are not required to disclose how much
they earn from the financial interests set out in paragraphs 12 and 13, but they may do
so if they wish.
No limits are set for outside earnings.
Italy - Senato and Camera dei Deputati
In Italy there are several incompatibilities with non elective public offices. Members of
parliament cannot simultaneously hold the following positions: ordinary magistrate, mag-
istrate of the Supreme Court and of the Supreme Committee of the Magistracy, member
of the National Council of Economy and Labor, executive manager of a state-owned or
state-assisted company. Ministers cannot receive any compensation for the functions they
exercise in companies or other entities that pertain to their ministries.
The Committee on Elections (Giunta per le Elezioni) is the institutional body in charge
for the decision concerning incompatibilities. In the first thirty days of the legislative
term, representatives have to declare all their public, institutional and private positions
to the Committee on Elections. They are asked to update this information over time
when changes occur. They also have to declare personal estate properties as well as any
shareholding and directorship. In case an incompatibility is detected, representatives must
choose whether they want to keep the public office or the private activity.
No limits are set for outside earnings, as in the UK.
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Appendix B. Normative Implications of the Theoreti-
cal Framework: Comparing Equilibria
The model presented in Section 3 highlights a trade-off between political selection and
moral hazard, which is driven by the possibility of making outside income when elected to
parliament. In Subsection 3.3 we briefly discussed the desirability of different equilibria.
We now make these normative implications more transparent. In particular, we assume
that the social output of a politician is a positive function of both ability and effort:
F (a, e) = eF˜ (a) + (1− e)[F˜(a)− λ] (8)
with F˜ ′(a) > 0 ∀a, F˜ (a)− λ > 0 for some a, and λ > 0. Politicians with higher skills are
more valuable because of their greater competence in problem solving. Politicians who
shirk produce instead a fixed social cost equal to λ.
How do the four nontrivial equilibria in Section 3.3 (A1, B1, C1, and C2) compare
with the counterfactual case of no outside income? As the set of elected politicians is a
random draw from the pool of citizens who self-select into politics, in the equilibrium with
no-outside-income the average output is
F¯ =
1
a1
∫
a1
0
F˜ (a)da. (9)
In case A1 (Figure 1), the average output is
F¯A1 =
1
a2
∫
a2
0
F˜ (a)da−
(a2 − a
∗)λ
a2
, (10)
i.e., the average productivity of a politician in the interval [0, a2) minus the shirking cost
of politicians in the interval [a∗, a2). The welfare comparison with the no-outside-income
situation depends on the relative position of a1 and a2. If a1 = a2, we have that F¯A1 < F¯ ,
since the average productivity is the same but outside income comes with a shirking cost.
If a1 > a2, we have that F¯A1 < F¯ , since outside income comes with both a selection
loss and a shirking cost. If a1 < a2, the comparison between F¯A1 and F¯ depends on the
primitive parameters, since outside income comes with a better selection that may (or
may not) compensate for the shirking cost.
In case B1 (Figure 2), the average output of self-selected politicians is
F¯B1 =
1
a¯− a2
∫
a¯
a2
F˜ (a)da− λ. (11)
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In this case low-quality (and potentially high-effort) citizens stay away from politics, since
a1 < 0. Hence, F¯B1 > F¯ , as long as high-ability politicians who shirk are not a net cost
for society, i.e., as long as F (a, 0) > 0, ∀a ∈ [a2, a¯].
In case C1 (Figure 3), the average output is exactly equal to the no-outside-income
counterfactual:
F¯C1 =
1
a1
∫
a1
0
F˜ (a)da, (12)
so that F¯C1 = F¯ .
Finally, in case C2 (Figure 4), the average output is
F¯C2 = w1
[
1
a1
∫
a1
0
F˜ (a)da
]
+ w2
[
1
a¯− a2
∫
a¯
a2
F˜ (a)da− λ
]
= w1F¯ + w2Fˆ , (13)
with w1 = a1/(a1 + a¯ − a2) and w2 = (a¯ − a2)/(a1 + a¯ − a2). Hence, the comparison
between F¯C2 and F¯ depends again on the primitive parameters. If the selection gain of
equilibrium C2 with respect to the baseline no-outside-income case (Fˆ − F¯ ) is greater than
the shirking cost (λ), then F¯C2 > F¯ , or vice versa.
The bottom line is that the welfare comparison of situations with and without outside
income is ambiguous. If outside income comes with a selection gain (case B1, case C2, and
case A1 with a2 > a1), this gain may more than compensate the shirking cost, leading to
a welfare improvement. If outside income comes instead with no selection gain (case C1
and case A1 with a2 ≤ a1), shirking always produces a loss. From society’s point of view,
it is not a priori clear whether outside income increases or decreases welfare.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Male 1,763 0.90 0.30 0 1
Age 1,763 50.95 9.34 27 88
Age at the Entry 1,763 47.27 9.22 26 88
Lower Secondary 1,705 0.02 0.12 0 1
Upper Secondary 1,705 0.26 0.44 0 1
B.A. 1,705 0.63 0.48 0 1
M.A. or Ph.D. 1,705 0.09 0.29 0 1
Lawyer 1,725 0.14 0.35 0 1
Top Civil Servant 1,725 0.07 0.25 0 1
Manager 1,725 0.09 0.28 0 1
Political Party Official 1,725 0.07 0.26 0 1
Journalist 1,725 0.08 0.27 0 1
Entrepreneur 1,725 0.10 0.30 0 1
Self Employed 1,725 0.09 0.29 0 1
Teacher 1,725 0.09 0.28 0 1
White Collar 1,725 0.04 0.20 0 1
Magistrate 1,725 0.02 0.15 0 1
Physician 1,725 0.08 0.27 0 1
Blue Collar 1,725 0.00 0.06 0 1
Professor 1,725 0.10 0.30 0 1
Trade Unionist 1,725 0.02 0.15 0 1
Army Officer 1,725 0.01 0.08 0 1
Student 1,725 0.00 0.03 0 1
House of Representatives 1,763 0.66 0.47 0 1
Government Coalition 1,763 0.53 0.50 0 1
Parliament Appointments 1,763 0.15 0.36 0 1
Majoritarian Election 1,763 0.75 0.43 0 1
North-West District 1,763 0.26 0.44 0 1
North-East District 1,763 0.18 0.39 0 1
Center District 1,763 0.18 0.39 0 1
South District 1,763 0.25 0.43 0 1
Islands District 1,763 0.12 0.32 0 1
Parliament Experience (n. terms) 1,763 1.03 1.38 0 12
Parliament Experience (years) 1,763 3.26 4.90 0 48
Ever appointed in:
Parliament 1,763 0.55 0.50 0 1
Government 1,763 0.19 0.39 0 1
Local Government 1,763 0.57 0.50 0 1
Political Party 1,763 0.51 0.50 0 1
Any 1,763 0.89 0.32 0 1
Note. Self reported previous job and highest educational level completed. Any means they held at least one of
the appointments listed above.
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Table 2: Percentage Absenteeism by Previous Job
Obs. Mean (%) St. Dev. Min. Max.
Student 2 42 0.27 0.23 0.61
Army Officer 10 39 0.30 0.02 0.83
Professor 159 37 0.29 0.01 0.91
Lawyer 239 37 0.27 0.01 0.99
Journalist 129 37 0.25 0.00 0.96
Magistrate 40 36 0.27 0.03 0.87
Top Civil Servant 112 36 0.30 0.01 0.97
Physician 127 34 0.27 0.00 0.95
Entrepreneur 165 34 0.28 0.00 0.97
Manager 145 34 0.27 0.00 0.90
Self Employed 154 32 0.26 0.00 0.96
Trade Unionist 38 31 0.30 0.01 0.86
Teacher 148 28 0.27 0.01 0.99
Political Party Official 115 27 0.26 0.00 0.98
White Collar 73 26 0.23 0.00 0.86
Blue Collar 6 23 0.29 0.02 0.79
Total 1,662 33 0.27 0.00 0.99
Note. Percentage of electronic votes not attended without any legitimate reason.
Table 3: Bills by Previous Job
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Army Officer 11 15.36 11.76 0 41
Lawyer 245 12.97 17.25 0 151
Magistrate 42 12.95 9.85 0 44
Physician 132 12.30 15.40 0 135
Teacher 152 12.06 17.49 0 112
Top Civil Servant 113 10.89 13.08 0 66
White Collar 75 10.84 12.05 0 75
Self Employed 159 10.83 17.01 0 170
Journalist 142 10.47 12.10 0 81
Blue Collar 6 10.17 14.39 0 38
Professor 167 10.14 16.74 0 117
Entrepreneur 167 8.28 8.34 0 41
Manager 149 7.96 8.75 0 44
Student 2 7.50 6.36 3 12
Political Party Official 122 6.99 9.17 0 55
Trade Unionist 41 6.85 9.68 0 53
Total 1,725 10.48 14.10 0 170
Note. Bills as main sponsor only.
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Table 4: Income Measures
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
All:
Total Income 1,688 185.7 142.7 213.0 123.3 5,542.4
Parliament Salary 1,763 124.8 123.3 1.5 123.3 126.4
Outside Income 1,688 60.9 17.9 212.9 0.0 5,419.1
Freshmen:
Pre-Election Income 859 103.3 70.6 138.0 0.0 2,663.6
Total Income 863 179.3 140.2 150.2 123.3 3,150.9
Parliament Salary 891 124.9 126.4 1.5 123.3 126.4
Outside Income 863 54.4 15.5 150.2 0.0 3,024.5
Note. All income measures are gross, in thousand of euros (2004 prices), and averaged between the second
and the fourth year in the term in office (except the pre-election income which refers to the fiscal year before
election).
Table 5: Outside Income by Previous Job
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. % > 100 % > 200 % > 500
Lawyer 240 113.5 54.3 179.1 31.25 14.17 4.17
Professor 161 109.3 28.1 393.4 19.88 11.18 1.86
Entrepreneur 161 106.6 24.7 452.7 16.77 7.45 4.35
Army Officer 9 82.8 95.7 36.0 33.33 0.00 0.00
Magistrate 42 60.6 28.1 74.0 28.57 4.76 0.00
Manager 141 58.1 11.5 181.8 9.22 3.55 2.13
Top Civil Servant 111 49.5 10.3 121.0 12.61 5.41 0.90
Self Employed 151 44.4 16.2 90.5 11.26 2.65 0.66
Physician 126 41.5 24.2 55.9 7.94 1.59 0.00
Journalist 127 37.6 11.1 63.5 10.24 3.15 0.00
Union Rep. 38 17.8 7.9 20.1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Teacher 148 17.2 8.4 22.2 0.68 0.00 0.00
White Collar 71 14.9 3.0 27.2 4.23 0.00 0.00
Political Party Off. 118 12.5 2.2 142.9 0.85 0.00 0.00
Blue Collar 6 2.1 0.2 3.2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Student 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1,652 61.4 17.6 215.1 13.38 5.27 1.51
Note. Gross outside income in thousand of euros (2004 prices), averaged between the second and the fourth year in the term
in office.
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Table 6: The Determinants of Absenteeism − GLM estimates
I II
dy/dx P-Value dy/dx P-Value
Outside Income 0.0178 0.000
Pre-Election Income 0.0297 0.000
Lawyer 0.0409 0.180 0.0266 0.617
Top Civil Servant 0.0138 0.672 0.0047 0.929
Manager 0.0282 0.352 0.0074 0.890
Political Party Official 0.0069 0.834 -0.0190 0.742
Journalist 0.0251 0.432 0.0260 0.652
Enterpreneur 0.0152 0.597 0.0165 0.752
Teacher 0.0124 0.698 0.0128 0.823
Self Employed 0.0122 0.677 0.0056 0.915
Magistrate -0.0319 0.307 -0.0311 0.469
Physician 0.0414 0.217 0.0451 0.453
Blue Collar -0.0092 0.916 -0.1790 0.000
Professor 0.0287 0.354 0.0340 0.546
Trade Unionist -0.0237 0.596 -0.0583 0.319
Army Officer -0.0097 0.878 0.0173 0.837
Male 0.0420 0.010 0.0723 0.001
Age -0.0016 0.024 -0.0030 0.002
B.A. Degree -0.0054 0.707 -0.0077 0.716
House of Representatives -0.1241 0.000 -0.1022 0.000
Government Coalition -0.3306 0.000 -0.2947 0.000
Majoritarian Election -0.0508 0.000 -0.0117 0.488
Legislature XIV -0.0948 0.000 -0.1066 0.000
Political Party Experience -0.0592 0.000 -0.0468 0.021
Parliament Experience 0.0138 0.238 0.0423 0.152
Government Experience 0.0842 0.000 0.0155 0.702
Local Government Experience -0.0219 0.056 -0.0285 0.094
Parliament Appointment -0.0111 0.492 0.0228 0.530
Party Appointment 0.0870 0.000 0.0624 0.010
Second Committee 0.0131 0.603 0.0154 0.642
Left-wing Coalition -0.0232 0.068 -0.0315 0.069
Macro-District of Election yes(5) yes(5)
AIC 0.8508 0.8794
N. of observations 1,624 767
Note. Dependent variable: percentage of votes not attended without a legitimate reason. GLM computed using a logistic
distribution. Clustered at individual level (in column I) and robust standard errors. AIC is the Akaike Information Criteria.
All income measures are gross, in hundred thousand of euros (2004 prices), and averaged between the second and the fourth
year in the term in office (except pre-election income which refers to the fiscal year before election). Representatives with
more than two million euros of income excluded. In column II, freshmen only and representatives with pre-election income
lower than twenty thousand euros excluded.
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Table 7: The Determinants of Bills − OLS estimates
I II
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
Outside Income -0.3594 0.012
Pre-Election Income -0.2939 0.109
Lawyer 1.1930 0.306 3.0183 0.019
Top Civil Servant -1.1145 0.321 1.8086 0.160
Manager -1.3138 0.236 1.0700 0.395
Political Party Official -2.8831 0.010 -0.6834 0.583
Journalist -0.1897 0.874 1.8998 0.165
Enterpreneur -0.5066 0.656 0.7763 0.530
Teacher -0.9739 0.386 0.3646 0.762
Self Employed -0.8979 0.447 0.9786 0.448
Magistrate 2.0347 0.167 0.6376 0.716
Physician -0.0088 0.994 1.5997 0.224
Blue Collar -2.0318 0.379 6.4787 0.000
Professor -1.9650 0.082 1.2151 0.322
Trade Unionist -1.5390 0.328 0.6213 0.679
Army Officer 6.4122 0.032 7.4599 0.031
Male -1.1030 0.092 -0.5324 0.518
Age -0.0923 0.000 -0.0933 0.001
B.A. Degree 0.1028 0.842 0.4721 0.438
House of Representatives -1.2998 0.002 -1.3696 0.009
Government Coalition -0.3115 0.363 -0.6201 0.223
Majoritarian Election 0.5853 0.169 0.9589 0.062
Legislature XIV -1.6180 0.000 -1.6328 0.001
Political Party Experience 0.7660 0.140 0.4422 0.495
Parliament Experience 2.4696 0.000 1.1162 0.293
Government Experience 0.4461 0.494 0.3050 0.802
Local Government Experience 0.6223 0.127 0.4309 0.391
Parliament Appointment 0.6060 0.303 2.7254 0.023
Party Appointment 0.5187 0.367 1.1848 0.101
Left-wing Coalition -1.7669 0.000 -2.1082 0.000
Macro-District of Election yes(5) yes(5)
R2 0.1274 0.1368
N. of observations 1,549 767
Note. Dependent variable: number of bills as main sponsor. Clustered at individual level (in column I) and robust standard
errors. All income measures are gross, in hundred thousand of euros (2004 prices), and averaged between the second and the
fourth year in the term in office (except pre-election income which refers to the fiscal year before election). Representatives
with more than two million euros of income, and more than 30 bills per legislative term, excluded. In column II, freshmen
only and representatives with pre-election income lower than twenty thousand euros excluded.
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Table 8: Income Distribution of Italian Population vs. Politicians - Quantile Regression
I II
τ α-Politician P-value α-Politician P-value
0.1 0.175 0.001 0.187 0.077
0.2 0.228 0.000 0.197 0.002
0.3 0.282 0.000 0.231 0.027
0.4 0.355 0.000 0.163 0.045
0.5 0.360 0.000 0.091 0.266
0.6 0.424 0.000 0.190 0.037
0.7 0.484 0.000 0.252 0.008
0.8 0.572 0.000 0.302 0.001
0.9 0.625 0.000 0.259 0.047
Italian Population 14,297 288
Representatives 459 223
Note. Dependent variable: logarithm of the net labor income (2004 prices), normalized to 0.1 when 0. Analytical
standard errors. Only managers, lawyers, self-employed, entrepreneurs, blue collars, teachers and white collars.
Freshmen representatives only. Income for the Italian population raised by 15% (white collars, blue collars,
teachers, and managers) and 30% (self-employed, lawyers, and entrepreneurs). Weights equal to the inverse of
the sampling probability for the SHIW Italian population sample, one for politicians. Individuals with more
than one million euros of income excluded. Also control for gender, type of job, age, year, and education. Age
between 25-60 in column I. Age between 40-60, males with at least BA degree, blue collars, teachers and white
collars excluded in column II.
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Table 9: The Pecuniary Gain from Election by Pre-Election Income Quintiles
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
Quintile: Income:
Pre-Election 106 33.0 33.0 7.4 20.5 45.7
Total 106 137.8 130.7 17.9 123.4 240.1
Parliament 106 124.6 123.3 1.5 123.3 126.4
I Outside 106 13.2 6.4 18.2 0.0 116.8
Pre-Election > Total 0
Pre-Election < Outside 13
Pre-Election 106 58.1 59.4 6.5 45.8 68.0
Total 106 149.7 137.5 33.2 123.3 321.1
Parliament 106 124.7 123.3 1.5 123.3 126.4
II Outside 106 24.9 14.1 33.2 0.0 194.7
Pre-Election > Total 0
Pre-Election < Outside 17
Pre-Election 105 80.3 79.0 8.0 68.2 95.8
Total 105 153.0 139.3 31.6 123.8 269.1
Parliament 105 125.0 126.4 1.5 123.3 126.4
III Outside 105 28.0 13.1 32.0 0.0 145.8
Pre-Election > Total 0
Pre-Election < Outside 9
Pre-Election 106 123.6 120.6 19.1 96.2 159.6
Total 106 177.6 157.2 56.2 123.4 385.4
Parliament 106 125.2 126.4 1.5 123.3 126.4
IV Outside 106 52.4 30.8 56.5 0.0 262.2
Pre-Election > Total 11
Pre-Election < Outside 13
Pre-Election 105 302.7 226.0 287.5 159.8 2,663.6
Total 105 357.3 260.7 363.2 124.3 3,150.9
Parliament 105 125.1 126.4 1.5 123.3 126.4
V Outside 105 232.2 134.3 363.1 0.6 3,024.5
Pre-Election > Total 43
Pre-Election < Outside 20
Note. Freshmen representatives only. All income measures are gross, in thousand of euros (2004 prices), and averaged
between the second and the fourth year in the term in office (except pre-election income which refers to the last fiscal year
before election). Teachers, white collars, army officials, political party officials, students, trade unionists, and blue collars
excluded. Representatives with pre-election income lower than twenty thousand euros excluded.
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Table 10: The Elasticity of Outside Income w.r.t. Pre-Election Income
I (OLS) II (IV-2SLS)
second-stage first-stage
Dependent variable Log Outside Income Log Outside Income Absenteeism
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
Log Pre-Election Income 1.2798 0.000(*) 1.3276 0.101(*) 0.0283 0.061
Absenteeism -5.4561 0.204
Lawyer 1.4420 0.005 1.4553 0.000 0.0451 0.255
Top Civil Servant 0.3596 0.496 -0.0056 0.989 0.0028 0.947
Journalist 0.3678 0.510 0.0940 0.852 0.0110 0.817
Enterpreneur 1.1627 0.022 0.9147 0.024 0.0006 0.987
Self Employed 0.9639 0.118 1.0948 0.013 0.0352 0.380
Professor 0.3751 0.451 0.2309 0.567 0.0241 0.575
Physician 0.9125 0.073 0.9350 0.048 0.0480 0.296
Magistrate -1.6790 0.000 -1.9032 0.003 -0.0161 0.798
Male 0.2299 0.480 0.5722 0.204 0.0562 0.161
B.A. Degree 0.0311 0.891 0.0328 0.910 -0.0238 0.389
Age 0.0464 0.000 0.0244 0.121 -0.0030 0.011
Political Party Exp. -0.3206 0.294 -0.1371 0.647 -0.0333 0.163
Government Exp. 0.2422 0.536 0.0901 0.883 0.0078 0.912
Local Government Exp. -0.3333 0.134 -0.5424 0.013 -0.0225 0.259
House of Representatives -0.2295 0.136 -0.7865 0.167 -0.1276 0.000
Majoritarian Election 0.0397 0.849 -0.3230 0.184 -0.0306 0.153
Government Coalition 0.1857 0.909 -1.9447 0.217 -0.3607 0.000
Parliament Appointment 0.3304 0.278 0.2152 0.613 -0.0272 0.622
Party Appointment 0.0275 0.933 0.0656 0.894 0.0863 0.002
Left-Wing Coalition -0.2480 0.246 -0.4011 0.109 -0.0254 0.240
Second Committee 0.1233 0.552 0.1613 0.575 0.0412 0.140
Legislature XIV -0.6972 0.001 -1.0852 0.026 -0.0969 0.000
Macro-District of Election yes(5) yes(5) yes(5)
Time-Distance from Rome -0.0176 0.032
F-test excluded instrument 5.00
R2 0.3699 0.6242 0.1965
N. of observations 506 393 393
Note. (*) H0: coefficient 6= 1. Dependent variable: Logarithm of outside income. Robust standard errors. Freshmen
representatives only. Lawyers, entrepreneurs, self-employed, magistrates, journalists, top civil servants, academics, physi-
cians, and managers only. All income measures are gross, in thousand of euros (2004 prices), normalized to 0.1 when 0,
and averaged between the second and the fourth year in the term in office (except pre-election income which refers to the
fiscal year before election). Representatives with more than two millions euros of income and pre-election income lower than
twenty thousand euros excluded. In column II, absenteeism is instrumented with the distance (in hours) from Rome.
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Figure 1: Negative Hierarchical Sorting with Moral Hazard (case A1)
Figure 2: Positive Hierarchical Sorting (case B1)
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Figure 3: Negative Hierarchical Sorting without Moral Hazard (case C1)
Figure 4: Two-Tail Sorting (case C2)
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Figure 5: Quantile Regression − Absenteeism on Outside Income
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Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications). No. of observations:
1,624. 95% confidence interval in dashed line. Representatives with more
than two million euros of outside income excluded.
Figure 6: Quantile Regression − Absenteeism on Pre-Election Income
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Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications). No. of observations:
767. 95% confidence interval in dashed line. Representatives with more than
two million and less than twenty thousand euros of pre-election income ex-
cluded.
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Figure 7: Pre-Election Income Comparison with the Italian Population
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Note. Labor income in thousand euros (2004 prices). No. of obs.: 486
politicians (freshmen only), 14,405 population. Only lawyers, managers,
entrepreneurs, white collars, teachers, blue collars and self-employed; age
between 25 and 60. Income for the Italian populationraised by 15% (white
collars, teachers, blue collars and managers) and 30% (self-employed,
lawyers, and entrepreneurs). Weights equal to the inverse of the sampling
probability for the SHIW Italian population sample, one for politicians.
The vertical line is the median of the national distribution.
Figure 8: The Pecuniary Gain from Election by Pre-Election Income Quintiles
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Note. Ratios of the mean valueswithin quintile. Freshmen representatives
only. 105 observations per quintile (see Table 9). Teachers, white collars,
army officials, political party officials, students, trade unionists, and blue
collars excluded. Representatives with pre-election income lower than
twenty thousand euros excluded.
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